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ABSTRACT  
   
This thesis argues for the utility of syntactic cartography in representing and 
analyzing the disputed language of legal statutes. It presents an analysis of two appellate 
court cases, Flores-Figueroa v. United States (2009) and In re Sanders (2008). Each case 
involves a difference of opinion with respect to the position and function of prepositions 
found in 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1) and 11 U.S.C. § 1328(f), respectively. Informing the 
tree structures are Merlo and Ferrer's (2006) six diagnostics for PP attachment: head 
dependence, optionality, iterativity, ordering, copular paraphrase, and deverbal nouns. In 
Flores-Figueroa, the analysis yields a conclusion that affirms the court's decision, as does 
the analysis in Sanders, although it only concurs in part. Implications of the study and the 
overall cartography approach are discussed, including how it could impact the drafting of 
jury instructions and future legislation. The paper also addresses the unique heritage of 
legal language, the ways in which it contrasts with civic, non-legal English, and how its 
characteristics give rise to ambiguity and vagueness, two suitable phenomena for 
linguistic analysis. Further, it discusses the potential for providing linguistic input on 
active cases to the Supreme Court and other judicial bodies. 
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PREFACE  
Justice Anthony Kennedy of the U.S. Supreme Court (2015) has observed that 
legal language features “a restraint, a discipline, a heritage, an elegance, a grammar, and 
a logic.” All of these components forge together into a unique tool capable of creating 
and extinguishing rights and obligations (Ainsworth, 2008). Because of that power, the 
law depends on language to establish a balance between undue burdens on the public and 
undesired disorder in society (Gibbons, 2003). Legislators face the task of producing this 
linguistic feat, and judges, attorneys, and the collective legal profession are charged with 
upholding the final product. Given the oft-indeterminate nature of language, it is not 
surprising that debates over interpretation and application of the law arise. How forensic 
linguists can contribute to addressing such instances of discord is the focus of this thesis. 
The present study presents syntactic analyses of the disputed statutory language in 
Flores-Figueroa v. United States (2009) and In re Sanders (2008). Each case involves a 
difference of opinion with respect to the position and function of prepositions and how 
they interact with neighboring words and phrases. Both to facilitate the discussion and to 
establish a basis for the conclusions drawn, syntactic cartography is advanced as a tool 
for forensic linguists. Utilizing tree structures familiar to syntacticians and to the 
linguistic community, I argue, is a viable means for offering expert analysis, be it in the 
role of expert witness, amicus brief author, or collaborator on an interdisciplinary study. 
Moreover, I assert that illustrating syntactic arguments by mapping the language in 
diagrams helps bridge the gap between the linguistic and legal disciplines, rendering the 
contributing analysis more accessible to individuals with disparate educational and 
professional backgrounds. 
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Others have similarly reviewed and evaluated court decisions retrospectively and 
from a linguistic perspective (Solan, 1993; Cunningham, Levi, Green & Kaplan, 1994; 
Hobbs, 2012; Kaplan, 2016). However, a detailed syntactic analysis of the language in 
debated court cases, particularly one leveraging tree structures to support its claims, 
appears to be absent in the literature. Filling this gap is thus a significant objective in the 
present study. A companion aim of this thesis is to build on the work of Cunningham et 
al. (1994), which, in addition to a review of decided cases, included two analyses of the 
pertinent language in Supreme Court cases yet to be decided at the time. However, my 
focus on prepositions, combined with the limitations of the 2017 Court docket, prevented 
this paper from replicating their approach. Any discussion herein of participating in an 
active case and contributing to a court decision is therefore restrained to hypothetical 
situations and to encouraging future studies as opportunities surface.  
The crux of this thesis is the aforementioned syntactic analyses. Yet, as Justice 
Kennedy observes, grammar only constitutes a single element of legal language. 
Therefore, in order to arrive at a more informed analysis, this paper begins with a 
background on the language of the law. It is important to note that only certain parts of 
Chapter 1 directly connect with the content of the subsequent chapters (e.g. ambiguity 
and textualism), but they are offered to put this thesis in better context. The chapter opens 
with an overview of the heritage of legal language, including an account of its history and 
its progression through the centuries. The chapter traces a rough timeline showing the 
influence of Latin and French on legal English. It subsequently examines the 
contemporary nature of the language, from its many criticisms to its many justifications. 
The following sections focus on how critics have advocated for more plain language in 
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the law, how the lack of plainness yields the issues of ambiguity and vagueness, and how 
within the legal profession there is division on resolving matters of interpretation. 
On the point of interpretation, textualism and purposivism are presented as the 
two leading schools of statutory interpretation; both groups emphasize the importance of 
context, but they disagree on what context to use. Generally speaking, textualists, as their 
name conveys, focus on the governing text, whereas purposivists look to outside sources, 
such as legislative history, to derive the meaning and purpose of a statute. Because this 
thesis is concerned with the linguistic influences that affect the interpretation of statutes, 
it happens to correspond with textualism. Yet, as the foregoing demonstrates, linguistic 
analyses need not only apply to the governing text. 
Chapter 2 introduces the relationship between the law and forensic linguistics, a 
field dedicated to the study of legal language. The chapter proceeds with a brief overview 
of the types of studies conducted in this area, such as identifying the author of an 
evidential text. In the sections that follow, the paper features a summary of how linguists 
participate in the legal system, including everything from serving as an expert witness to 
helping facilitate jury instruction revisions toward more plain and accessible language. 
Chapter 2 concludes by evaluating the work of Solan (1993), Cunningham et al. (1994), 
and Kaplan, Green, Cunningham, and Levi (1995). In this section, the importance of 
statutory interpretation is addressed, as well as the need for more detailed syntactic 
analyses in forensic linguistics. It also points out the ideal nature of pursuing 
interdisciplinary studies with linguistics and members of the legal profession, given that 
such an approach yields higher credibility than does, for example, a single scholar 
submitting an unsolicited analysis to the court. 
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Chapter 3 narrows the scope of forensic linguistics to syntax, starting with a 
succinct treatment of the discipline and a note on the influence of Noam Chomsky. It 
moves forward by describing syntactic cartography and how tree structures have 
developed and transformed in recent decades. How the trees are formed and what they 
represent is additionally discussed. In syntax, the current Minimalist Program (Chomsky, 
1995) is shifting away from utilizing tree diagrams to model and represent language, but I 
nonetheless argue for the viability of these multi-dimensional tree structures in the 
forensic linguistics context. Because the debates in Flores-Figueroa v. United States 
(2009) and In re Sanders (2008) hinge on prepositions, Chapter 3 addresses the topic. 
The bulk of the analysis relies on the attachment diagnostics developed by Merlo and 
Ferrer (2006). These guidelines help determine the position and function of prepositions 
and the phrases they head. 
Chapter 4 comprises the original analyses of this thesis. The focus on prepositions 
and the limits of the Supreme Court docket for 2017, as mentioned, prevented the 
inclusion of active cases. To my knowledge, Flores-Figueroa v. United States (2009) and 
In re Sanders (2008) are the most recent cases of their kind. The Flores-Figueroa case 
falls in line with the cases examined by Solan (1993) and Cunningham et al. (1994) (all 
of which involve the scope of the word knowingly – Flores-Figueroa similarly questions 
whether a preposition falls within that scope), and the Sanders case is listed in Scalia and 
Garner’s (2012) book on textualism and the canons of statutory interpretation (this case 
involves determining what verb a preposition modifies). Although both cases were 
appealed, a point of contrast between the two is that the Supreme Court heard Flores-
Figueroa and the United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit heard Sanders. The 
  x 
original intent was to source cases that had reached the Supreme Court, as these are more 
prominent and more easily accessed by the public both before and after the actual oral 
arguments. In the end, however, the discussed constraints yielded the present data set. 
The analyses in Chapter 4 build on those presented by the opposing sides of the 
argument, as well as the decisions written by the judges. With the aid of tree structures 
and the syntax literature, the evaluations go into greater depth than the court opinions, 
providing detailed illustrations of the statutory language along with discussion. In the 
spirit of Cunningham et al. (1994), the conclusions do not contend to have simplified the 
complexity of these cases, nor do they claim purchase on “the right answer” (p. 1561). 
Alternately, they aim to justify the contributive capacity of syntactic cartography, namely 
its ability to conceptualize legal language in new dimensions, resulting in a novel 
approach that neither attempts to circumvent or supplant the interpretive methods 
instantiated by the legal profession. 
Chapter 5 offers a conclusion with thoughts on future directions for this kind of 
study. These include reaching beyond the topic of prepositions to explore other areas 
within syntax and, more broadly, encouraging the active legal participation of forensic 
linguists in cases that arise in the future, both locally and nationally. 
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CHAPTER 1 
LEGAL LANGUAGE 
Legal language can be divided into spoken and written traditions. Attorneys, 
judges, and members of the collective legal profession depend on both daily. However, 
discourse and literacy are merely two umbrellas to the multiple dialects and registers that 
exist within legal language (Gotti, 2012; Goźdź-Roszkowski, 2011; Williams, 2007). 
Legal writing shifts in style and tone from statutes to judicial opinions, legal speech 
differs greatly between police interviews and courtroom deliberation, and legal language 
as a whole differs from civic or non-legal language in distinct ways.  
The first section gives a brief history of how English has evolved with respect to 
the law, including examples of Anglo-Saxon, Latin, and French influence. Subsequent 
sections discuss the contrasts between ‘legalese’ and ‘plain English’ and provide a 
summary of the plain language movement and its challenges. In addition, Chapter 1 
examines a pair of complications that arise in legal writing, namely ambiguity and 
vagueness. Two predominant schools of legal interpretation are introduced, as well as a 
look at the ongoing debate between them. 
 
Historical Foundations 
The word law entered the English language through a series of linguistic derivations 
and borrowings, moving from Old Icelandic to Anglo-Saxon by way of Old Norse and 
Scandinavian (Mellinkoff, 1963). The Oxford English Dictionary (OED) provides that 
law in Old Icelandic – or lǫg – referred to ‘something laid or fixed.’ This meaning still 
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resonates today. Just as the word law evolved through language, legal language itself 
reflects a rich unfolding.    
Pinpointing the precise origin of legal English is a moot endeavor. Nevertheless, a 
tenable timeline begins with the Celts, who arrived on the British Isles some 3,000 years 
ago (van Gelderen, 2014). The Romans invaded and ruled the Celts for a time, but left 
during the fifth century. Years later, around 450 AD, Germanic tribes (Angles, Saxons, 
etc.) reached the isles to help defend the Celts against their enemies. These mercenaries 
settled down in England and introduced their language: Anglo-Saxon, or Old English. 
The Old English period lasted from approximately 450-1150 AD. Law-related 
language was present at the time, and examples of Anglo-Saxon legal vocabulary include 
witness, will, bequeath, guilt, theft, steal, right, murder, and oath (Tiersma, 1999, p. 12). 
Latin also started influencing Old English late in the sixth century, when the 
population began converting to Christianity (van Gelderen, 2014). The Romans from 
earlier centuries spoke Latin, too, but without the same lasting effect as the Christians. 
Along with spoken Latin, Christian missionaries and clerics introduced literacy, which 
would greatly impact the language of the law (Tiersma, 2012). 
What had been a purely oral and undocumented tradition now featured a written 
component. The introduction of literacy provided a means for organizing and 
consolidating the legal thinking that had been diversified by centuries of wide-ranging 
cultural interaction – Romans, under the rule of Julius Caesar, had conquered the Celts 
and occupied the British Isles (Tiersma, 2012); the Germanic tribes brought with them 
their inchoate flavors of law; Christians ushered in the governance of the Roman church; 
and Scandinavian Vikings introduced aspects of Danelaw in the eighth century (Tiersma, 
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1999). Then, in 1066, the Normans conquered England in the Battle of Hastings, and 
French was added to the mix (van Gelderen, 2014). 
Legal documents originally appeared in Old English, but as a result of the Norman 
Conquest, Latin eventually became the written language of choice about 1100 AD 
(Mellinkoff, 1963; Tiersma, 1999). To the Normans, Latin was familiar and attempts to 
displace Old English were a symbol of their power. From another standpoint, Latin 
writing may have also achieved a level of clarity and precision that superseded the 
ambiguities in and fluid nature of Old English (Gu, 2006). 
Companion to Latin writing, French became the language of the ruling class and the 
spoken language of the law, relegating English to the masses. The first group of 
professional lawyers emerged around 1200, and these individuals received their training, 
in French, at the Inns of Court (Tiersma, 1999). Principles of common law, upheld today 
in the U.S and several other countries, were first given voice in French (Tiersma, 2012). 
Gu (2006) asserts that French enabled increased sophistication of law-related 
communications both in terms of lucidity and logic. Such was the impression of the 
Normans that even after English made its return across classes, legal professionals 
continued to communicate in French (Gibbons, 2003). 
English, Latin, and French all persisted as viable languages of the law in England for 
several centuries, and switching between them was not uncommon: French served as the 
preferred language of drafting statutes for a period, universities upheld the tradition of 
Latin, and English never fully died out. In 1731, however, English Parliament declared 
English the official language for legal proceedings (Tiersma, 1999). Subsequent to that 
decision the government approved the continued use of certain terms and phrases from 
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Latin and French. Preserving conceptual accuracy was one supporting reason, but it was 
also because finding an adequate translation in some cases proved nearly impossible. 
 
Latin and French in modern legal English. Numerous Latin words and phrases 
abide in the current American legal system. Among these, several bear closely on the 
foregoing. One example is certiorari, which the OED lists as ‘to be certified, informed, 
or shown.’ In the legal system, certiorari is a type of writ, or order from a court. The U.S. 
Supreme Court, for example, grants a writ of certiorari to between 70 and 80 cases each 
year. With this writ, the Court certifies a case for review and requests more details to 
inform its decision. 
Another important Latin phrase is mens rea, or, roughly, ‘a criminal state of mind’ 
(OED). Cases involving this principle require proof of a guilty mind to convict an 
individual of a particular crime (Solan, 1993). In other words, there must be evidence that 
the individual knew he or she was breaking the law (these cases also have what is called a 
scienter requirement, scienter being the Latin adverb ‘knowingly’). More detail on mens 
rea in Chapter 4. 
Other examples of Latin pertain to legal interpretation. Scalia and Garner (2012) 
outline more than 55 canons of interpretation which bear Latin names because of their 
venerability in the law. Such canons include: generalia verba sunt generaliter 
intelligenda (‘general terms are to be given their general meaning’), expressio unius est 
exclusion alterius (‘the expression of one thing implies the exclusion of others’), and 
verba cum effectu sunt accipienda (‘if possible, every word and every provision is to be 
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given effect’). These canons apply to statutes – written law passed by a legislative body – 
and they inform and shape court decisions. More detail on one of the canons in Chapter 4. 
The phrase stare decisis, ‘to stand by decided matters,’ is another instance of 
enduring Latin. Urofksy (2015) defines stare decisis as “the doctrine of abiding by and 
adhering to previously decided cases” (p. 10). This is the Latin representation of 
precedence (from French), which also signifies the notion of reaching judicial decisions 
in line with previous conclusions. Precedence, from the spoken tradition, and stare 
decisis, from the written, are foundational to common law as practiced in the United 
States (Gibbons, 2003). 
In addition to precedence, legal terms borrowed from French include attorney, 
court, claim, complaint, agreement, misdemeanor, and felony (Tiersma, 2012, p. 21). 
Words like complaint are employed in both legal and non-legal contexts, and countless 
other examples exist because the history of legal English is not isolated from the history 
of English (Mellinkoff, 1963). Indeed, French influence, together with the Latinate, 
accounts for approximately half of the English language (van Gelderen, 2014). 
French is not only a source of vocabulary, but also a language applied to accent 
legal writing. In a recent concurring opinion, Justice Ginsburg of the U.S. Supreme Court 
penned the phrase faute de mieux, or ‘for lack of a better alternative.’ Wrote the Justice, 
“When a state severely limits access to safe and legal procedures, women in desperate 
circumstances may resort to unlicensed rogue practitioners, faute de mieux, at great risk 
to their health and safety” (Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 2016, p. 2, emphasis 
added). Opting for French, or Latin, instead of English may further be viewed as a 
rhetorical strategy for elevating the authoritative ring of a text (Tiersma, 2012).  
  6 
Moreover, English is the standing lingua franca in the United States and its 
courts, where judges routinely grant certiorari when attorneys file appeals. The language 
of the law will undoubtedly continue to evolve to reflect society, however conservative 
the pace. But one thing is certain of legal English in the 21st century: the influence of 
Latin and French is felt throughout. 
 
Linguistic Features 
The language of the law, for all of its changes and developments over time, has 
sustained a single constant in its existence, namely criticism. Irish record hints that Celtic 
poets, perhaps the earliest bearers of legal language, received public censure for their use 
of obscurities (Tiersma, 1999). Centuries later, the author Charles Dickens offered his 
own criticisms in literary form, dedicating much of his oeuvre to satirizing the legal 
profession. In his novel Bleak House (1853), he describes the members of the High Court 
of Chancery as not only guilty of obscure speech but also 
 mistily engaged in one of the ten thousand stages of an endless cause, tripping one 
 another up on slippery precedents, groping knee-deep in technicalities, running 
 their goat-hair and horse-hair warded heads against walls of words, and making a 
 pretense of equity with serious faces, as players might. (p. 14) 
 
Dickens leveraged his writing platform to express his sentiments and those of the lay 
public, but not all such evaluations are external. In fact, members of the legal profession 
often take issue with the language employed in their own vocation. In the case In re 
Grydzuk (2006), Judge J. Philip Klingerberger penned the following criticism of 
Congress: 
 [W]hile a debate rages over whether William Shakespeare or someone else wrote 
 the plays and sonnets attributed to the Bard of Avon, there will never be a similar 
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 debate over the authorship of the [Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer 
 Protection Act of 2005], because no one wants to be associated with that body of 
 work. (p. 566-567) 
 
Judge Klingerberger wrote this to identify 11 U.S.C. § 1328(f)(1) (analyzed in Chapter 4 
of the present study) as one in “a long string of incredible [sic] poorly drafted statutory 
provisions” (In re Grydzuk, 2006, p. 567). Beyond the critical Celts, Victorian authors, 
and bankruptcy opinions, countless other examples persist from every imaginable angle 
of the law. Legal language may or may not merit the full sum of its criticism, but it is 
unequivocally different from everyday English and therefore subject to scrutiny. What, 
then, sets the language of the law apart? What constitutes “legalese”? The following is a 
brief overview of the linguistic features of legal language. 
 
The legal lexicon. Jargon is one key distinguisher of legal language. Lawyers use 
specialized words, just like members of any other profession or speech community, as a 
way of achieving inclusion and exclusion all at once (Gibbons, 2003). Because of the 
conservative nature of legal language, much of the jargon is archaic words – e.g. 
aforesaid, hereinafter, heretofore – preserved for purposes of consistency, even as they 
change meaning or fade out of use in society. The persistence and tradition of these 
words, which mark the legal vocabulary as distinct, traces back to the Latin and French 
influences discussed in the previous section. 
 Along with archaic terms, the legal lexicon also features a number of words that 
speakers of English routinely deploy in non-legal settings. After all, as Mattila (2012) 
points out, “legal language is based on ordinary language” (p. 27). Examples include 
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witness, right, and agreement, and words like these carry relatively steady semantic value 
from context to context. Yet they may have crucial legal nuances, as well. One good 
example is the word construction. 
 Scalia and Garner (2012) note the polysemous nature of construction, a noun that 
corresponds to semantically contrasting verbs. On the one hand, construction can refer to 
the act of interpreting, while on the other it can indicate the act of building. The latter 
meaning has more traction outside of legal contexts. Legal professionals traditionally 
adhere to the former – one who construes the constitution performs a constitutional 
construction, or an interpretation thereof; but to construct the constitution is another task 
altogether (one for James Madison). 
Polysemy, or the capacity for certain words to carry multiple meanings, is thus 
one more factor in the legalese-everyday English divide. Attorneys and judges utilize 
words that appear familiar and accessible to most, only they deploy them as terms of art 
with technical meanings. While this practice is not unique to the law, it is nonetheless of 
note, especially in combination with the grammatical aspects of legal language. 
 
The legal grammar. In legal contexts, sentence structures vary from those of the 
vernacular and standard forms of English. “Complex” is perhaps the most common 
descriptor of legal grammar, but more detailed characteristics include the use of multiple 
negatives (e.g. “shall not”), frequent passive structures, and a sizable amount of 
nominalizations (Schane, 2006). Mellinkoff (1963) points out the issue of redundancy: 
attorneys frequently refer to “a last will and testament,” which may have a “force and an 
effect” or may be declared “null and void” (p. 363). In terms of lexical density, legal texts 
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statistically feature more content words than function words (Gibbons, 2003). Successive 
embedded clauses also contribute to the complexity, along with the presence of conjoined 
phrases, impersonal constructions (in the “building” sense of the word), and the 
avoidance of pronouns (Tiersma, 1999).  
 “Unusual” is another adjective regularly ascribed to legal language and its 
sentence structures. Tiersma (1999) notes that common divergences from “ordinary” 
speech include adverbials preceding participles, nouns followed by modifying finite 
clauses, and a reordering of prepositional phrases and noun phrases. The example he 
provides of the latter is the phrase “a proposal to effect with the Society an assurance,” 
which follows a verb-prepositional phrase-noun phrase ordering (V-PP-NP), contrastive 
with the more common V-NP-PP ordering of “a proposal to effect an assurance with the 
Society” (Tiersma, 1999, p. 65, emphasis original). 
 Finally, there is the characteristic of verbosity: legal documents, communications, 
and proceedings are known, if nothing else, for their sheer length. Although length is not 
a direct point of grammar per se, such elements as embedded clauses and conjoined 
phrases all contribute to extended writing and lengthy periods of deliberation. At one 
point in England, a correlation between attorney wages and page count motivated 
verbosity (Tiersma, 1999). The practice of widened margins continues today, as seen, for 
instance, in the formatting of Supreme Court opinions, although members of the 
collective legal profession no longer receive a page-count commission. Instead, attorneys, 
judges, and the like make their living by striving for linguistic precision, the kind of 
exactness that routinely and incongruously requires wordiness. A later section in this 
chapter gives more attention to the topic of precision. 
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 Take the grammatical features above, factor in a dense and archaic lexicon, and 
the result is a highly specialized register commonly viewed as difficult-to-understand and 
generally inaccessible. Efforts to reshape and improve the nature of legal language have 
included everything from public protests to legislative reform. Toward linguistic 
reconciliation in the law, one overarching campaign is the plain language movement. 
 
The Plain Language Movement 
Like legal language, the exact genesis of the plain language movement is 
unknown. Some credit British author Sir Ernest Gowers with opening the door in 1948 
with his book Plain Words, which preceded Complete Plain Words in 1954 (Gibbons, 
2003). Around that same time, Indiana University law professor Reed Dickerson taught 
plain writing to his students (Adler, 2012), and in 1963 another law professor, David 
Mellinkoff, published The Language of the Law, a tome that lambastes legalese. Others 
claim 1970 as the beginning. Between that year and 1973, New York-based Citibank 
proposed and adopted a policy for converting promissory notes into easily understood 
language (Williams, 2007). Citibank unwittingly started a trend that soon spread into 
other industries, such as real estate and insurance. From there, plain language took off as 
a consumer-driven movement (Schane, 2006). 
Former U.S. President Jimmy Carter endorsed the movement in the late 1970s, as 
did President Bill Clinton in the 1990s with his Memorandum on Plain Language, 
“requiring all Executive Departments and Agencies to use plain language” (Williams, 
2007, p. 175). More recently, President Barack Obama signed the Plain Writing Act of 
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2010, along with three executive orders – E.O. 13563, E.O. 12866, and E.O. 12988 – 
calling for plain language in the regulatory system. 
Other notable plain language supporters in the United States today include Joseph 
Kimble, professor emeritus of the Western Michigan University Cooley Law School and 
author of Lifting the Fog of Legalese (2005); Bryan Garner, a leading lexicographer, 
founder of LawProse.org, and author of numerous publications on legal writing; and U.S. 
Supreme Court Associate Justice Clarence Thomas, known for his criticisms of 
inaccessible Court opinions, intense editing practices, and commitment to clarity and 
simplicity. 
The concentration on plain language is not exclusive to the U.S., nor is it limited 
to the field of law. Canada, the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, 
France, Germany, Sweden, and Finland all have groups and organizations endeavoring to 
improve the accessibility of legal language. Outside of the law, fields with linguistic 
movements toward plainness include medicine, religion, finance, marketing, and the 
sciences. Adler (2012) observes that “plain language studies” may indeed become a 
formally recognized, international discipline. 
The plain language movement seems self-explaining, but what exactly do its 
proponents advocate? The following features a definition of plain language and a brief 
discussion on the challenges associated with the movement. 
 
Plain language. A working definition for plain language is “language and design 
that presents information to its intended readers in a way that allows them, with as little 
effort as the subject permits, to understand the writer’s meaning and to use the document” 
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(Cutts, 1996, p. 3). In this light, the plain language movement is less about ‘dumbing 
down’ communications, as opponents would say, and more about efficiency. It further 
aims to remove linguistic barriers between citizens and institutions by helping people 
understand their rights and the agreements they enter. 
In the legal context, suggestions for achieving this ideal essentially involve 
removing the characteristic elements of legalese: eliminate archaic expressions, reduce 
sentence lengths, strike unnecessary words, decrease passives, and so on (Williams, 
2007). In theory, and arguably in practice, these strategies lead to clearer, more accessible 
language for both the public and the profession itself. Easier said than done applies well 
here. 
For one, although their end product may not always match the original objective, 
legal writers already strive for clarity, precision, unambiguity, and inclusiveness (Bhatia, 
2010). Superfluity, as stated by Judge Sutton of the United States Court of Appeals, Sixth 
Circuit, is “a result we must resist where possible” (In re Sanders, 2008, p. 400). 
Moreover, legislation like the Plain Writing Act of 2010 makes plain language the law. 
Yet, enforcing a standard is a challenge, one highlighted by the condition where possible 
in Judge Sutton’s opinion and the caveat as the subject permits in Cutts’ definition. 
Because legal language facilitates the practice of law, even the plainest words and 
phrases will unavoidably convey complex ideas. Gibbons (2003) describes these ideas as 
“how the legal system views the social and physical world” (p. 36). A perfectly written 
statute or contract may therefore be clear, precise, unambiguous, and inclusive, but not 
plain. 
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Proponents of the plain language movement must also address the point of 
language change. Linguistic evolution renders even the best of plain language measures 
temporary and dependent upon faithful revision and upkeep. A rewritten or rephrased 
document that meets today’s standard of plainness may fail to do so a generation later, 
introducing a new barrier for the layperson (Stygall, 2010). In addition to time, plain 
language will vary across space, as speakers differ in their levels of literacy and social 
capital. Thus, even attempting to arrive at a standard that satisfies the here and now 
would lead to a nuanced result.  
Legal language has almost always been at odds with plain or ordinary speech, 
though the two never become too distant from one another, despite a perpetually 
widening and narrowing gap (Tiersma, 1999). Plain language proponents, to whom Adler 
(2012) refers as ‘plainers,’ face a tall order in addressing the challenges inherent to their 
undertaking, but they have the potential to positively impact the way society operates, as 
everything from small print on credit card statements to jury instructions (see Chapter 2) 
falls within their scope. 
 
Ambiguity and Vagueness 
Plainness can help resolve issues of clarity and accessibility, but, as explained in 
the previous section, the complex nature of the law will often result in language that is 
neither clear nor accessible. Further still, legal language is subject to its share of 
indeterminacies, which typically manifest in the form of ambiguity or vagueness. 
Sometimes this effect is unintentional, other times it is deliberate. Consider, for a 
moment, the task of the legislator. 
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With wording that is too restrictive, a lawmaker may produce an infelicitous 
provision that burdens or otherwise limits the public; with language that is too general, 
the same writer may alternately authorize disorder in society (Gibbons, 2003). Balancing 
these extremes is not the only obstacle, though. Legislators must predict and preempt 
possible misinterpretations of their writing, as well as misapplications, and the final 
product must also align with precedent (Bhatia, 2010). Drafting a law with so many 
variables at play complicates the pursuit of linguistic precision. The outcome will often 
lack desired clarity, and in some instances it may even be strategically unclear. 
English speakers generally describe a lack of clarity as “ambiguous” or “vague.” 
Although colloquially synonymous, these two words differ in their technical senses and 
the distinction holds important ramifications for the legal context. I will examine each in 
turn. 
 
Ambiguity. Solan (1993) states, “ambiguity results any time that our knowledge 
of language...fails to limit to one the possible interpretations of a sentence” (p. 64). It may 
rest in a single word – such as construction from earlier – or it might stem from the 
placement of a modifying phrase. In either scenario, one finds a set of fixed alternatives 
from which to choose (e.g. A or B). The important distinction here is that the 
speaker/listener or writer/reader narrows down the options to one rather than determining 
what those options are. Ambiguity assumes the existence of precision even in the 
presence of possibilities (Poscher, 2012). 
 Ambiguity is likewise found in instances where only one interpretation seems 
possible. Take, for example, the U.S. Supreme Court. The Justices have historically 
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convened, listened to a case, and agreed on the clarity of a certain statute, only to reach a 
5-4 split decision in the end (Kaplan et al., 1995). Everyone agrees that a single 
interpretation exists but they disagree on what that meaning is because there are, among 
the Court members, at least two different ways to make sense of the text. Sometimes only 
one side will view a statute as ambiguous. In Yates v. United States (2015), Justice Elena 
Kagan wrote a dissenting opinion arguing for the clarity of the provision in question, 
claiming that its breadth did not equate to ambiguity, as her colleagues in the majority 
maintained. Yates also provides a good example of vagueness. 
 
Vagueness. The substance of Yates entails the question of whether a fish 
classifies as a tangible object. Justice Kagan underlines the absurdity of the case by citing 
Dr. Seuss’ One Fish, Two Fish, Red Fish, Blue Fish (1960) to affirm that a fish does, in 
fact, classify as a tangible object (Yates v. United States, 2015). More crucially, she 
identifies that the majority reached its decision by limiting the scope of the ‘tangible 
object’ definition, such that it excluded fish. Herein lies the concept of vagueness. 
Vagueness, in contrast with ambiguity, operates on a scale or spectrum. What 
constitutes a tangible object? What does not? One can think of clear answers for both, but 
the borderline cases require real thought. Because a vague notion does not furnish any 
fixed alternatives to choose from, the only real option is subjective interpretation, or what 
Poscher (2012) calls “creative concept formation” (p. 133). 
The Court discussed the ambiguity and vagueness in Yates as interchangeable 
concepts, but that is not uncommon (Slocum, 2015). Notwithstanding, a distinction 
between the two is quite useful since they can prompt contrasting methods of 
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interpretation. How to navigate these kinds of linguistic issues is a major point of 
contention in the law. In the absence of a single method for clarifying legal language, 
practitioners and scholars have developed and subscribed to various schools of 
interpretation, each with its own merits. 
 
Schools of Interpretation 
Roughly 80 percent of Supreme Court decisions are accompanied by at least one 
dissenting opinion (Urofsky, 2015). Not all of these disagreements involve matters of 
language and meaning, but for those that do, three schools of statutory interpretation are 
considered tenable: textualism, purposivism, and intentionalism (Slocum, 2015). The 
latter two have much in common and textualism closely compares to the doctrine of 
ordinary meaning, arguably a school in its own right. Because of these similarities, the 
more salient positions in the literature, namely textualism and purposivism, will receive 
attention here.  
Judges who subscribe to textualism or purposivism commonly utilize some 
variation of “We begin with the words of the statute” in their written opinions. The 
differences quickly become apparent, though, in how members of the judiciary proceed 
and where they arrive. 
 
Textualism. Many credit the late Justice Antonin Scalia for pioneering the 
textualism movement, beginning with his early days as an appellate judge and 
subsequently as a member of the Supreme Court. In Reading Law: The Interpretation of 
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Legal Texts, Scalia and Garner (2012) summarize the school by stating what it means to 
be a textualist:  
We look for meaning in the governing text, ascribe to that text the meaning that it 
has borne from its inception, and reject judicial speculation about both the 
drafter’s extratextually derived purposes and the desirability of the fair reading’s 
anticipated consequences. (p. xxvii) 
 
Legislative purpose (associated largely with purposivism) and any anticipated 
consequences (conceptualized by consequentialism, or intentionalism) found in outside 
sources have no place in the textualist program, which dismisses textual departures as 
fruitless. However, that the textualist exclusively analyzes the words of a statute is not 
always the case. Indeed, individuals of this interpretive persuasion often consult 
dictionaries on points of grammar, style, and technical usage. In fact, since the 1980s, 
when Justice Scalia first sat on the bench, evidence of judges relying on dictionaries has 
grown substantially (Slocum, 2015). To arrive at ‘the meaning born from inception’ 
(generally in determining the constitutionality of a matter), textualists also refer to The 
Federalist and documents from the Constitutional Convention (Urofsky, 2015). 
 Texualists lean on the aforementioned sources for help with issues at the lexical 
level, but the majority of cases involving a linguistic dispute hinge on the meaning of a 
word in context or a particular syntactic structure (Katzmann, 2014). In these 
circumstances, the textualism program depends on a set of canons (e.g. those listed in the 
Latin and French section of this chapter). Some provide instruction on points of grammar, 
but a fair amount supply contextual or conceptual aid (Solan, 1999). A setback for these 
interpretive tools is that they can conflict with one another, forcing judges to decide 
which convention carries the greater weight. Yet, as Scalia and Garner (2012) note, “they 
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are not ‘rules’ of interpretation in any strict sense but presumptions about what an 
intelligently produced text conveys” (p. 51). Justice Kagan (2015) adds the description of 
“formalized intuitions.” The canons are thus properly regarded not as the final word but 
as a contributing voice in the ruling process. 
 Dictionaries, The Federalist, and the canons all play important roles in the 
textualist program, which aims to find the meaning most faithful to the original and 
governing text, the one approved by both chambers of Congress and the President 
(Katzmann, 2014). But in consulting these sources, textualists spur criticism from 
purposivists. 
 
Purposivism. Purposivists inveigh against the textualism program not because of 
its use of extratextual sources but because it criticizes the puposivism school for the same 
practice. The two theories emphasize the importance of context, but they disagree on 
which context has primacy, the semantic value of a text (its meaning) or the conveyed 
policy (its purpose) (Manning, 2006). Proponents of the latter method therefore search for 
evidence of the legislator’s intent, whether in the text itself or in the legislative history 
(Fallon, 2014).  
In Milner v. Department of the Navy (2011), Justice Kagan writes, “Those of us 
who make use of legislative history believe that clear evidence of congressional intent 
may illuminate ambiguous text” (p. 9). Legislative history furnishes the context in the 
purposivist camp. It is found in committee reports composed by statute drafters, as well 
as in the notes and records from various Congressional hearings. Such resources contain 
details and instructions pertinent to the purpose of a statute, including how to interpret it 
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and how to put it into action (Katzmann, 2014). They are viewed as contemporaneous 
materials that support legislation, similar to the relation between The Federalist and 
Constitutional matters. Legislative history might be conceptualized, in a way, as the 
unabridged version of a statute. But as purposivists will readily acknowledge, the law is 
the law and legistlative history simply provides a helping hand. 
Some cases feature undisputable language and the task of interpretation begins 
and ends with the text, regardless of methodological persuasions. In these situations, 
purposivists assert that legislative history can confirm a decision. In more complex 
matters, the purposivism program ostensibly allows judges to apply the intentions of 
fixed statutory language to scenarios unanticipated at the time of drafting (Katzmann, 
2014). Yet opponents of the method argue the same point as an advantage of the ordinary 
meaning doctrine, claiming, “meaning must surpass intent” (Slocum, 2015, p. 15). This 
illustrates just one of the many conflicts that the schools of interpretation share with one 
another. 
Just as textualists and purposivists agree on the significance of context, both 
groups agree that neither of their methods is without flaw. After all, arriving at the 
semantic meaning of a text that satisfies every speaker within its intended purview is 
seemingly as impossible as deducing legislative purpose when countless minds and 
motivations contributed to the final draft. While both schools merit further treatment of 
their respective complexities, it suffices here to differentiate the textualist and purposivist 
programs by their general tenets, the one adhering to linguistic properties and the other to 
conceptual cues. 
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The nature of this paper happens to correspond more closely with textualism. It 
focuses on what Fallon (2014) terms, the “linguistic and cultural understandings that 
influence, and indeed determine, what a linguistically competent person would 
understand a statute to say” (p. 707). Nevertheless, as members of the legal profession 
lean on both schools from time to time, the present objective is to offer another resource 
to any and all involved in the interpretation of statutory language, including, as Chapter 2 
will show, ordinary citizens in the role of juror. 
  
Conclusion 
Chapter 1 has provided a general timeline of the development of legal language, 
accompanied by a review of its unique and dynamic characteristics, possible areas for 
refinement and increased plainness, and the prevailing methods of interpretation. With 
this context as the backdrop, the following chapters proceed with an account of forensic 
linguistics (the intersection of linguistics and the law), syntax and tree structures, and 
linguistic analyses of a Supreme Court case and one from the United States Court of 
Appeals, Sixth Circuit. 
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CHAPTER 2 
FORENSIC LINGUISTICS 
The heritage of legal language has attracted the attention and interest of scholars and 
professionals from widespread disciplines for generations. Many have presented data, 
insights, and theoretical approaches to assist the legal system with its proceedings. The 
admission of forensic evidence in court, for instance, dates back to 1911 when 
fingerprints were first approved to help decide People v. Jennings (Koehler, 2013). 
Around that time, Justice Louis D. Brandeis, then a practicing attorney, wrote the first 
brief in which the majority of the text consisted of statistics from disciplines outside the 
law (University of Louisville Brandeis School of Law, n.d.). His writing in Muller v. 
Oregon, a 113-page document with more than 100 pages of non-legal data, serves as the 
template for what many call a ‘Brandeis brief.’ Over the last century, forensic evidence 
and interdisciplinary analysis has gained greater utility in the legal system, giving rise to 
such fields as forensic linguistics. 
At its rudiments, forensic linguistics is the study of evidentiary language and of legal 
discourse. Johnson and Coulthard (2010, p. 7) divide the field into three subsections: 
1. The study of the written language of the law 
2. The study of interactions in the legal process 
3. The work of linguists in the role of expert witness 
 
Forensic linguistics further encompasses a notably wide range of concentrations, 
including methods and studies from applied linguistics (Eades, 2005); corpus linguistics 
(Finegan, 2010; Kredens & Coulthard, 2012); linguistic ideology (Ainsworth, 2008); 
phonetics (Olsson & Luchjenbroers, 2014, p. 83-136); pragmatics (Finegan, 2010; 
Danaher, 2015; Kaplan, 2016); semantics (Kaplan et al. 1995; Hobbs, 2012); 
  22 
sociolinguistics (Eades, 2006; Kurzon, 2013); syntax (Kaplan, 1993; Klinge, 2000; 
Williams, 2007); Systemic Functional Linguistics (Nini & Grant, 2013); TESOL 
(Pavlenko, 2008); and translation and cross-linguistic interpretation (Berk-Seligson, 
2012). Among other functions, these approaches contribute to identifying the authorship 
of an evidential text, highlighting potential judicial bias in court opinions, and 
understanding power dynamics in society. 
This paper is concerned with the role of the linguist as expert witness, with jury 
instructions, and with statutory interpretation – and the intersections of the three. Chapter 
2 proceeds by briefly addressing the expert witness role and bringing the topic of jury 
instructions into focus, connecting the latter with the importance of statutory 
interpretation. The chapter then considers the work of Cunningham et al. (1994) in 
assisting the Supreme Court with two cases, and it highlights a gap in the literature. 
 
The Linguist as Expert Witness 
In the Jennings case, the Court described an expert as someone possessing 
“peculiar knowledge or experience not common to the world, which renders their 
opinions...an aid to the court or jury in determining the questions at issue” (as cited in 
Koehler, 2013, p. 515). Linguists with professional and academic training fall under this 
description when the ‘questions at issue’ involve language. But beyond generally 
recognizing the status of a PhD or an individual with similarly advanced experience, 
there is not as yet an official credentialing system or baseline requirements for linguists to 
qualify as experts. 
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Stygall (2009), among others, has suggested possible solutions based on the 
policies and practices of other disciplines, but the burdens associated with instituting a 
formal organization (i.e. time, costs, etc.) seem to have prevented progress so far. In the 
anticipation of a formal system, linguists should strive to identify their own limits and 
decline their services when cases require expertise different from their own. For example, 
a highly regarded phonetician attempting an analysis of a complex semantics issue could 
lead to problems easily avoided by instead referring the case to a highly regarded 
semanticist. The objective is to optimally fulfill one’s oath to tell ‘the whole truth’ and 
nothing else, which the phonetician in the hypothetical situation is less likely capable of 
than her colleague. Linguists must therefore recognize whether or not their own 
competence will honestly contribute to a case. Incompetence, “at least to the extent that 
the testifier knows—or should know—the testimony is incompetent,” is unethical 
(Butters, 2009, p. 238-239). 
Linguists may be called upon to contribute their knowledge as an expert witness 
in court. In addition, they may volunteer their skillset in certain ways, such as by writing 
an amicus brief or by submitting a scholarly article to the Court. Other forms of 
participation are likely permissible, but I will only discuss the dynamics of the 
aforementioned three. 
 
Expert witness in court. Attorneys typically call linguists to serve as an expert 
witness. In some instances, though, the judge will request a linguist’s assistance on behalf 
of the court. Each of these assignments is considerably different. When working with an 
attorney, a linguist bases her analysis on the information given to her, and that 
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information is shaped to provide the best case for the client – that is, with the end goal of 
winning (Finegan, 2009). The perceived imbalance of linguists working on one side or 
the other makes the apparent neutrality of a judge hiring an expert witness seem more 
appealing, although it bears its own challenges. Butters (2009) argues that even if 
neutrality or impartiality can be proven, such a practice contradicts the adversarial 
system. His reasoning is that if a linguist presents an analysis that influences the decision 
of the court, the produced bias may compromise the right to legal representation, even 
with an otherwise fair and accurate assessment of the language in question.  
Finegan (2009) believes the best option is to have opposing experts equally 
capable of fulfilling their role in the process. In theory, this means that if attorneys on 
both sides enlist the aid of a linguist, the analysis provided by each will differ because 
they did not start with the same data. Linguists will not always have a say on the role they 
receive, but they should always be mindful of these nuances and how they can affect their 
ultimate analysis or opinion. 
An additional point of mindfulness is the way in which linguists present their 
expertise to those present in the courtroom. Expert witnesses must offer their insights in 
terms relatable to the attorneys, the judge, and the jury, which adds another layer to the 
plain language equation: it now involves balancing legal language, plain language, and 
linguistic language. Koehler (2013) observes that forensic linguists, and experts in 
general, run the risk of presenting their testimony in a way that is ultimately 
counterproductive, notwithstanding good intentions. Specialized language, he asserts, can 
create greater ambiguity or even result in an unintentional misrepresentation of the 
evidence or an inadvertent misinterpretation of the statute, such that the jury gives more 
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weight to a particular detail because of its ‘staging’ in important-sounding technical 
terms. 
On the one side, linguists must determine what their obligation as an expert 
requires in terms of unpacking and presenting the complexities involved in their analysis 
(Finegan, 2009). And they need to demonstrate their qualifications through their speaking 
and writing, that is, through the quality of their work. However, on the other side, their 
responsibility is to “explore and articulate the...intuitive but usually unconscious 
understanding” that speakers have of their language (Cunningham et al., 1994, p. 1565). 
Because they are attempting to show people what they already know, the conclusion of 
even a rigorous analysis may appear self-evident.  Finding a balance that satisfies 
everyone can be supremely difficult. 
 
Amicus briefs. Another form of expert participation is the tradition of amicus 
curiae, or ‘friends of the court,’ which dates back to the Romans. In principle, the 
practice involves submitting an unsolicited report with scientific evidence or a 
philosophical argument that an individual or group believes will help the court reach a 
more informed decision (Umbricht, 2001). Linguists have the opportunity to draft an 
amicus brief if they so choose. The process necessitates keeping up with the court’s case 
docket so as to provide any potentially helpful materials prior to the oral arguments (i.e. 
the official hearing of the case). 
 One caveat with amicus briefs is that their public perception has evolved over 
time: “what was once a gesture of friendship has become a deliberate act of advocacy” 
(Umbricht, 2001, p. 778). Because these briefs have garnered a reputation of underlying 
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bias or partiality, the classification alone of such documents can taint the objectivity and 
credibility of a linguist’s work (Kaplan et al., 1995). That is not to say that linguists 
should avoid or abandon the practice – a strong analysis is a strong analysis, whether or 
not it bears the amicus title. 
 
Scholarly articles. In 1994, Cunningham et al. (a law professor and three 
linguistics professors) submitted a galley of their paper “Plain Meaning and Hard Cases” 
to the Supreme Court. The paper, which the authors refer to as an essay, was later 
published in The Yale Law Journal. Part of the essay reviews The Language of Judges 
(1993) by Lawrence Solan, and part of it features an original analysis of cases then 
currently before the Supreme Court. The following year, Kaplan et al. (1995) – the same 
team of scholars – published an article in Forensic Linguistics revisiting their efforts. In 
United States v. Granderson, Justice Ginsburg wrote the majority opinion and she cited 
the essay in The Yale Law Journal; she did the same in her concurring opinion in United 
States v. Staples. 
Kaplan et al. (1995) note that while they assisted the Court, sending pre-
publication manuscripts can be problematic. The nature of a galley is that no one else has 
access to it yet, including both parties involved in the case. Thus, although the essay was 
unsolicited, it creates the same scenario of an expert witness retained by a judge. In both 
instances, the linguist or team of scholars is only providing information to the deciding 
individual or individuals, rather than to everyone involved, potentially swaying the 
thinking and decision making of the justice(s). It seems that simply sending the same 
information to everyone, pre- and post-publication might prevent such an outcome. 
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Whereas an amicus brief may not be held in the highest public esteem, a scholarly 
article seems better suited for achieving the purposes of an unsolicited report, particularly 
one produced through interdisciplinary collaboration. The Cunningham et al. (1994) and 
Kaplan et al. (1995) papers motivated the present study for this very reason. I will further 




The Sixth and Seventh Amendments to the United States Constitution enumerate 
the right to a trial by jury in criminal and civil cases, respectively. In the early history of 
the nation, the jury had considerable influence in court proceedings, including 
determining what constituted acceptable evidence, but since the end of the nineteenth 
century, judges have instructed the jury and jurors have been expected to conform (Solan, 
2010). Even so, members of the jury still hold the power of making decisions that affect 
the livelihood of their fellow citizens. Because of that power, the accessibility of their 
instruction can either help legitimize or delegitimize the American legal system (Stygall, 
2012). 
 
Jury selections and the court process. Jurors are initially summoned as a matter 
of civic duty, and they are ultimately selected through a process of questioning called 
voir dire. The questioning takes place after the pleas in a trial, and once the jury is in 
place, jurors receive preliminary instructions with general details on their role and usually 
a brief background on the case. Attorneys then provide opening statements, present 
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evidence and question any witnesses, and finish with closing arguments (Stygall, 2012). 
Then, having listened to the proceedings, the jury receives instructions specific to the 
case (Marder, 2012). During the proceedings, a judge will sometimes provide additional 
clarification to the jury if a certain piece of evidence is inadmissible (Gibbons, 2003), or, 
they might, for example, remind jurors not to give the testimonies of police officers any 
special consideration because of their position of authority (Marder, 2012). 
Instructions in some instances include nothing more than the statutory text or the 
language of a previous judicial decision (Tiersma, 1999). State and federal courts across 
the United States typically utilize pattern instructions drafted by committees of legal 
professionals, and judges have the option of rephrasing or adding to them if they deem it 
necessary (Marder, 2012). In effect, jury instructions are an “abbreviated legal education” 
focused on a single case (Dattu, 1998, p. 67). 
 
Instructions: verbal and written. The issue of plain language appears again with 
this topic, as researchers from the fields of linguistics and psychology, among others, 
have found jury instructions to be largely incomprehensible to the lay public (Dumas, 
2000). And beyond any challenges presented by the language itself, part of the trouble is 
that in some instances the jury has no written copy of its directions and, should a juror 
ask a question, the judge will simply re-read the instructions (Solan, 2010). Members of 
the judiciary choose to repeat instead of clarify largely because in clarifying, they are 
subject to influencing the decision, even as they aim for total objectivity. Repeating 
verbatim is thus the safe route for judges, as “paraphras[ing] the instructions in more 
modern terms might invite a reversal by a higher court because of some perceived change 
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in meaning” (Tiersma, 1999, p. 96). Further, a misrepresentation of the law can result in 
an entirely new trial (Marder, 2012). 
Coulthard and Johnson (2010) point out the difficulty of making sense of 
instructions even when jurors have a printed copy in their possession. Again, the legal 
education in these scenarios is abbreviated. Further, while judges and attorneys have 
various resources for interpretation at their disposal (e.g. dictionaries, legislative history, 
etc.), jurors do not benefit from the same resources or the time to apply them. They are 
limited to the text provided to them and the constraints of reaching a timely decision 
(Solan, 2010). 
Another crucial influence on jury instructions is the variable of courtroom 
discourse, that is, the linguistic context that frames the entire proceeding. The judge 
controls the hearing by determining who is permitted to speak and what is permitted to be 
spoken, and these directions serve to create a narrative that is unique to the courtroom 
and foreign to the layperson. Attorneys are typically cognizant of these rules of decorum, 
and for them, following the cues of the judge and their colleagues becomes second 
nature. However, for jurors who may only sit on the jury once in a lifetime, these 
inaccessible rules of discourse can have an exclusionary effect (Stygall, 2012). The 
members of the jury are left, after closing arguments, to determine how best to apply their 
instructions to the atypically presented narrative. 
 
Revising jury instructions. Arizona and California are two examples of states 
that have rewritten their jury instructions to meet plain language standards and to help 
jurors more fully fulfill their civic duties. The process, as one might imagine, is labor-
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intensive. In California, for example, revisions required six years for civil law cases and 
another eight for criminal law cases (Marder, 2012). As discussed in Chapter 1, language 
change necessitates continual revision and upkeep in order to satisfy any plain language 
standards, so an honest revision process will be an ongoing one. 
The other side of the coin is that jury instructions must be “legally watertight,” i.e. 
faithful to the statutory language, in order to earn and maintain the approval of the legal 
profession (Gibbons, 2003, p. 174). Similar to a judge providing potentially non-
objective insight to members of the jury, a poorly written set of instructions can just as 
easily lead to a reversal from an appellate court. Here, the important connection between 
jury instructions and statutory interpretation becomes more apparent: how an author 
drafts the instructions depends on an initial interpretation of the original governing text. 
So while the decision remains in the hands of the jury, the instructions – and, crucially, 
the writer or writing committee – influences that outcome with its perception of the law. 
In addition to attempts to rectify jury instruction issues linguistically, Dattu 
(1998) proposed leveraging illustrations to create better connections between the law and 
the public. He identifies that the legal profession already observes this practice in cases 
where it is more effective to visually depict complex ideas and that it is not uncommon to 
find a diagram or picture in legal memoranda, judicial opinions, and other documents of 
the kind (Dattu, 1998). In the sections and chapter that follow, I will argue for directly 




  31 
Forensic Linguistics and Statutory Interpretation 
In the forensic linguistics literature, the salient example of linguists engaging in 
statutory analysis is Cunningham et al. (1994). Their publication in The Yale Law 
Journal, introduced earlier in this chapter, provides a book review and a new analysis of 
legal language, and it also spurs a lively debate at a subsequent symposium. Starting with 
The Language of Judges, this section will present those proceedings chronologically for 
the dual purpose of examining the linguistic analyses and addressing the criticisms that 
emerge with this type of endeavor.  
 
The Language of Judges (1993). Cunningham et al. (1994) dedicate a significant 
portion of their essay to reviewing The Language of Judges (1993) by Lawrence Solan, 
an attorney, law professor, and linguist. One of Solan’s (1993) focuses is on the ruling of 
United States v. Yermian (1983) and United States v. Yermian (1984). Each case involves 
a dispute over the language in 18 U.S.C. § 1001, which underwent a change between 
1938 and 1948. The original text positioned the phrase “in any matter within the 
jurisdiction of any department or agency of the United States” after the adverb 
“knowingly,” and the revision features the same phrase before “knowingly.” 
In Yermian, the issue is whether Yermian is guilty for simply knowing he falsified 
his record or if it must also be proven that he knew he did so within the jurisdiction of a 
federal agency – he admitted to the former but claimed having no awareness of the latter. 
The U.S. Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit viewed the statutory language as ambiguous, 
and on the grounds of inadequate jury instructions, it called for a rehearing of the case. 
The next year, United States v. Yermian (1984) reached the Supreme Court, which called 
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the language of 18 U.S.C. § 1001 plain (though the Court split 5-4 in its decision), noting 
it only requires proof of knowingly falsifying information. Yermian was found guilty. 
What interested Solan (1993) were the linguistic factors of the case, namely 
whether or not the PP “in any matter...” falls within the scope of knowingly. The 
legislative history provides that the language in 18 U.S.C. § 1001 was intended to bear its 
same meaning when changed in 1948, which is to suggest that the position of the PP 
should have no consequence. However, Solan (1993) argues that preposing the PP 
reduces, if not eliminates, any ambiguity. But he essentially stops there, leaving the 
reader wanting. 
 
Plain Meaning and Hard Cases (1994). In contrast with Solan (1993), 
Cunningham et al. (1994) decided to analyze cases prior to their official hearings in the 
Supreme Court. Part III of “Plain Meaning and Hard Case” provides an account for 
United States v. Staples, another case involving the scope of ‘knowingly,’ and Part IV, 
which I will review here, examines United States v. Granderson. 
Cunningham et al. (1994) refer to United States v. Granderson as “the case of the 
missing referent” (p. 1577). The referent is missing from 18 U.S.C. § 3565(a), which 
outlines part of the punishment for the destruction of mail. Granderson pled guilty, and he 
received a five-year probation term instead of the maximum six months in prison. After 
violating probation, he received a new sentence of twenty months in prison. 
The court based its decision on the section of 18 U.S.C. § 3565(a) that reads, “the 
court shall revoke the sentence of probation and sentence the defendant to not less than 
one-third of the original sentence” (as cited in Cunningham et al, 1995, p. 1578). The 
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issue is whether original sentence refers to the maximum six months in prison or the five-
year probation term, one imposing a two-month minimum of jail time and the other a 
twenty-month minimum. 
Several different appellate courts heard this case, and they all split on their 
interpretation of the statute. While the different judges and attorneys battled over the 
referent of original sentence, Cunningham et al. (1994) turned to the meaning of the word 
sentence itself as it appears in the legislative history. The team found an interesting 
distinction Congress passed in 1984 that put the words probation and sentence on 
synonymous ground. Prior to that act, probation meant probation and sentence meant 
prison. According to the history of 18 U.S.C. § 3565(a), it appears that the pre-1984 
semantic values of probation and sentence were upheld in drafting (Cunningham et al., 
1994). Thus, Granderson’s prison sentence should have been no fewer than two months 
and not more than six – and certainly not the twenty he received. 
Perhaps the most compelling argument made in the essay is that linguistic 
analysis can help point a legislative history consultation in the right direction. Locating 
the actual source of confusion in United States v. Granderson led to finding a useful 
explanation of the indeterminacy of the statutory language. This interaction goes to show, 
as Cunningham et al. (1995) observe, “that close attention to text is not necessarily at 
odds with the use of legislative history in statutory interpretation” (p. 1582). 
 
Bringing linguistics into judicial decision-making (1995). As noted earlier in 
this chapter, Justice Ginsburg cited “Plain Meaning and Hard Cases” in the majority 
opinion of United States v. Granderson and in her concurring opinion in United States v. 
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Staples. In “Bringing linguistics into judicial decision-making,” Kaplan et al. (1995), the 
same Cunningham team, viewed this result as hopeful for “those interested in seeing 
growth in the recognition of the relevance of linguistics to the law” (p. 96). Cunningham 
had hoped to produce something that was “more than academic” (Kaplan, 1995, p. 83); 
that is, something more than the after-the-fact analyses of Solan (1993). Cunningham and 
his colleagues achieved just that, and Justice Ginsburg confirmed it with her writing. 
 
The Northwestern/Washington University Law and Linguistics Symposium 
(1995). The Cunningham et al. (1994) and Kaplan et al. (1995) papers precipitated the 
1995 Northwestern/Washington University Law and Linguistics Symposium, attended by 
leading scholars of both disciplines. In the wake of that event, the Washington University 
Law Quarterly published a special issue featuring observations on the potential for more 
interdisciplinary work like “Plain Meaning and Hard Cases.” Some either embraced or 
seemed open to the idea (Lawson, 1995; Popkin, 1995), while others were hesitant or 
intensely critical (Greenawalt, 1995; Poirier 1995). 
What is interesting is that while forensic linguistics continued to grow in the years 
that followed – even at a rapid pace through the subsequent decade (Coulthard, 2005) – 
instances of linguists attempting to assist the Court in ways similar to Cunningham et al. 
(1995) appear to have faded out. Hobbs (2012) and Kaplan (2016), for example, take the 
approach of Solan (1993) and revisit influential Supreme Court cases, but their analyses 
are, again, completed after-the-fact. Although out of necessity this paper takes such an 
approach, encouraging more work like Cunningham et al. (1995) is a parallel objective. 
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Conclusion 
 Chapter 2 has introduced the field of forensic linguistics and narrowed down the 
focus of this paper to the role of linguists in contributing to matters of statutory 
interpretation. As discussed, the task of statutory interpretation often affects juries. This 
chapter has also shown that interdisciplinary scholarship in the form of co-authored 
papers appears to be a favorable approach for offering unsolicited expert insight. Further, 
it has highlighted instances of scholars evaluating syntactic issues in legal language, 
although a detailed syntactic analysis performed and presented to the courts appears 
absent in the literature. This paper aims to begin to address that gap, starting with an 
introduction on syntax in Chapter 3. 
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CHAPTER 3 
SYNTAX 
As a discipline, syntax, like other areas within linguistics, aims to articulate the 
intuitions that speakers have about language. Some intuitions involve the sounds and 
meaning of words, and syntax bridges the gap between them (Carnie, 2007). Put 
differently, syntax is the study of the ordering of words and phrases that allow speakers to 
extract meaning from sound, as well as from signs (i.e. sign language) and visual cues, 
such as the written word. With syntax, we give chronology to language – which words 
come first and which come last – and, depending on the language, we know to read left-
to-right, right-to-left, top-to-bottom, and so on (Pinker, 2014). The principles that govern 
syntactic combinations and sequences have attracted efforts to describe and, more 
recently, explain them (van Gelderen, 2013; Patel, 2008). These are the overarching 
objectives of syntax. 
Some syntactic principles hold true cross-linguistically, that is, they function across 
all languages, while others are language-specific. Still others apply broadly to language 
groups and families, though not universally. English, for example, is a subject-verb-
object (SVO) language, one of many, Arabic is verb-subject-object (VSO), and Turkish is 
subject-object-verb (SOV). Spanish shares the SVO characteristic of English, as does 
Russian, generally speaking, yet Spanish and Russian syntax contrast with English in 
important ways, including the position of adjectives in Spanish (noun-adjective versus the 
adjective-noun in English) and the case system in Russian (English only features case in 
its pronouns). Adequately describing and explaining these and other characteristics 
depends on robust theories and comprehensive empirical approaches. 
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Modern syntactic theory emerged in the 1950s with the early work of Noam 
Chomsky, and since then, what is known as Generative Grammar has evolved organically 
from its roots (Tomalin, 2002). As the title suggests, Generative Grammar focuses on 
how people generate language. The current iteration of this approach is the Minimalist 
Program, also proposed by Chomsky (1995). Minimalism in syntax regards language as 
finite in its resources and infinite in its ability to produce (Baker, 2013). Assuming 
finiteness, or a certain amount of limitation, the program further views language as a 
system with principles of economy – ‘less is more.’ Minimalism is, in point, not a theory 
but a disciplined lens for observing and conceptualizing language. 
 The Minimalist Program and it predecessors comprise a remarkable range of 
applications and findings that extend beyond the latitude of this study. Narrowing down 
the scope, Chapter 3 will first discuss the shift in Minimalism away from what has been 
the traditional approach of modeling linguistic data cartographically, and it will present 
an argument for the utility of syntax trees in commenting on statutory interpretation. A 
later section focuses on prepositional phrases and various methods for classifying them, 
all of which will factor greatly into the Chapter 4 analyses. 
 
Trees 
 When dealing in abstraction, many disciplines find it useful to model, graph, or 
otherwise visually represent their ideas. Linguistics is no different. With respect to 
language, Alonzo Reed and Brainerd Kellogg reportedly innovated the concept of 
diagramming sentences during the 1870s, and their method appeared in American school 
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curricula for nearly 100 years (Pinker, 2014). The Reed-Kellogg notation looked 
something like this: 
Figure 1 – “In Sophocles’ play, Oedipus married his mother” (Pinker, 2014, p. 77). 
 
The diagram outlines pretty clearly the SVO nature of English by placing Oedipus 
married mother in sequence. With a little instruction, the descending diagonal lines 
would make more sense, but at first blush, it is no wonder this notation went out of style. 
In the 1970s, roughly a decade after the Reed-Kellogg system disappeared from schools, 
linguists began employing X-bar theory, which utilizes tree structure to diagram the 
structure of phrases. Tree structure, which one may fairly view as a variation on Reed and 
Kellogg, is a mathematical tool developed with the purpose of uniformly representing 
sentence structure (Schweikert, 2005). Under X-bar theory, the sentence “In Sophocles’ 
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Figure 2 – “In Sophocles’ play, Oedipus married his mother” in X-bar notation 
 
The difference between Figure 1 and Figure 2 is more than a simple ninety-degree 
rotation. With the Reed-Kellogg notation, the sentence is presented more linearly; X-bar 
theory presents the sentence vertically and, more crucially, as having a truer hierarchy. 
This distinction is important because of what Generative Grammar assumes about 
language, namely that it has a recursive nature that allows for limitless production – 
language is finite, but its productive potential is infinite. 
A basic tree structure projection features three levels: a head, an argument, and a 
specifier. The head is an indispensable element (e.g. an adjective phrase must at least 
have an adjective); the head selects an argument (e.g. an adjective selects a noun to 
modify); and a specifier, although difficult to fully define, is a position for the 
grammatical subject of a clause and a destination point for phrases that move (e.g. wh-
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movement) (Schweikert, 2005). A structure may also optionally feature an adjunct. 
Figure 3 will help illustrate this last element and how it and the first three pieces come 
together: 
Figure 3 – Basic tree structure projection (Nunes, 2013, p. 77). 
 
X0 combines, or merges, with YP to form the constituent X’. Then, X’ merges with ZP to 
form the phrase XP. XP can also optionally merge with the adjunct WP, depicted on the 
top left (it can be argued that the projection starts from the top and moves downward, but 
I will not take a position here). The components X0 and YP are referred to as ‘sisters,’ 
and they are ‘daughters’ of the ‘mother’ X’. Similarly, X’ and ZP are sisters. The head X0 
will only have one argument (YP) and one specifier (ZP), but adjuncts (WP) have no 
fixed limit and can, in theory, iterate ad infinitum (Nunes, 2013). Moving toward a more 
concrete explanation of this concept, consider a similar tree structure with the inclusion 




  41 
Figure 4– “John hit the ball” 
 
The tree in the figure above is slightly different from the one in Figure 3. It shows how 
the constituents can build upon each other and hints at the potential for very large 
diagrams. But just the same as in Figure 3, John hit the ball is a structure with sisters, 
daughters, and mothers: the and ball are sisters, daughter of the DP, and as a constituent, 
they are the sister of hit, etc. This is important to note because it reflects how each word 
modifies or is modified – thinking of the and ball as syntactic siblings is merely a way to 
describe the relationship in which the modifies ball. The tree in Figure 4 represents the 
process of taking four words from the lexicon and putting them in a comprehendible 
order for others to hear or see. 
 If you take the sentence John hit the ball and add optional information to it, such 
as with a bat, the tree structure easily accommodates this adjunct. Figure 5 demonstrates 
the change: 
 
  42 
Figure 5 – “John hit the ball with the bat” 
 
First, it is important to note the relationship between hit (V) and the ball (DP). The two 
are sisters, which means one (V) modifies – and depends on – the other (DP). Because hit 
is the head and the ball is the argument, the latter is obligatory. Without it, John hit does 
not quite make sense. It is additionally important to point out that hit the ball (V’) and 
with a bat (PP) are sisters. In this case, the PP, an adjunct, modifies the entire V’. This is 
because with a bat is optional information. You can say John hit the ball without any 
grammatical problem. Adding with a bat specifies or clarifies the event, but it does not 
improve or diminish the grammaticality of the utterance. This difference between 
obligatory and optional information is simple, but Chapter 4 will show how consequential 
misrepresenting it can be, especially with regard to prepositional phrases like with a bat. 
 As mentioned, trees can reflect much larger and more complex matters of syntax. 
Figure 4 shows very simply what John hit, or the ‘who did what to whom’ information 
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that is crucial for communicating events. Figure 5 adds the ‘how’ or ‘by what means’ to 
the equation. Notice the VP at the top of each diagram. This signals that all of the 
information in the sentence, at least as depicted in Figures 4 and 5, is housed in the verb 
phrase. However, it is possible for the tree structure to extend above the VP to include a 
TP and a CP. Together these three elements form what is known as the basic spine of a 
clause. Figure 6 illustrates this and notes what occurs in each layer: 
Figure 6 – The basic, three-layered spine of a clause 
 
The top of the tree, or the CP layer, houses pragmatic material, including the mood of the 
clause and details information structure (e.g. topic – old information; and focus – new 
information). Below the CP is the TP, which stores information related to “tense, 
(epistemic) mood, aspect verbal agreement, and grammatical case” (van Gelderen, 2013, 
p. 66). The VP layer at the bottom details the argument and event structure, showing the 
transitivity of verbs based on their internal aspect, that is, their semantic value. 
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 The basic spine is simply that, a spine or an outline, and it grants flexibility for 
modeling essentially any syntactic phenomenon. One might compare a syntax tree to an 
accordion for its ability to compress and expand. This allows for accurately reflecting the 
language in question or highlighting specific components of a clause. For instance, a 
sentence might map out across all three layers – the CP, TP, and VP – but if a linguist is 
only interested in the TP level, she has the option of expanding or zooming in on that 
portion and not giving the same attention to surrounding layers. 
 With respect to the flexibility of the tree structure, linguists hold opposing views 
of what information should be included in any diagram. One side favors the Cartographic 
approach and the other prefers the bare phrase structure method, both of which fall within 
the parameters of Generative Grammar. Cartography provides a highly detailed rendering 
of language, while bare phrase structure, as its name implies, provides the minimum 
amount of information needed. The Minimalist Program naturally gravitates to the latter. 
With the simple phrase eat apples, Figure 7 juxtaposes Cartography with bare phrase 
structure: 
Figure 7 – Cartography vs. bare phrase structure (Jayaseelan, 2008, p. 91) 
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Note that the Cartography tree features the same labeling of its branches as in X-bar 
theory. The bare phrase structure leaves these out entirely, and the head of the phrase, in 
this case eat, is provided as the label for the entire projection. More recently, Chomsky 
and other linguists have started to move away from labels and trees altogether, adopting 
instead a linear set notation. In this approach, the same phrase in 6 would look like (1), 
or, more minimally, like (2), from Jayaleesan (2008, p. 94): 
(1) {eat, {eat, apples}} 
(2)          {eat, apples} 
 
Linguists have a number of options at their disposal when it comes to 
diagramming syntax, and they have to decide which of these representations to employ 
based on their benefits and drawbacks. For the present study, I will not use set notation 
because my objective is to take statutory language out of its linear presentation and to 
model it in a different light. Instead, I take a mixed approach featuring elements of 
Minimalism and Cartography to achieve the desired levels of dimension and detail. From 
a Minimalism perspective, the analyses provide an economic depiction of the language in 
question; on the Cartographic side, the analyses do not follow Cartography in the 
technical sense (see Cinque, 2006; and Rizzi, 2013), but they do cartographically 
represent the language in the general sense, that is, they function as maps. Minimalism 
allows for looking at the language at its most basic, and Cartography will simplify the 
level of abstraction needed to convey what each tree represents. The ultimate aim is to 
present an accessible, economic analysis. 
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Prepositions and Prepositional Phrases 
In this paper, the bulk of my analysis will focus on prepositions and how they 
figure into the tree structures discussed in the previous section. Here, I will briefly 
describe the syntactic characteristics of prepositions and provide a sample of the relevant 
literature. 
Prepositions belong to the functional and closed-class categories of words, as 
opposed to the lexical and open-class, and their basic grammatical role is to introduce 
nouns. Flexible in where they can position and versatile in how they function, they also 
express the relationship between words and phrases, and they can do so either 
obligatorily or freely (Fang, 1999). Because of their flexibility and versatility, 
prepositions exhibit “diverse grammatical behavior,” which can be problematic at times 
(Croft, 2013, p. 14). 
For instance, one closely studied topic in syntax is the resolution of ambiguities 
involving prepositions (Katsika, 2008). In studies on second-language (L2) acquisition of 
English, prepositions (and articles) are the grammatical components that generate the 
highest number of errors (Girju, 2008). Computational linguists have found the same to 
be true with parsing systems, namely that prepositional phrases present the greatest 
challenge for classification (Merlo & Ferrer, 2006; Fang, 1999). As will be shown in 
Chapter 4, prepositions can also be at the center of legal debates. In point, prepositions 
are tricky. 
With respect to tree structure, a preposition is the head of its phrase, and it can 
combine with a prepositional object (e.g. a determiner phrase or a noun phrase). The 
prepositional phrase (PP) can attach to the structure of the clause in one of four ways: as 
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an argument to a noun phrase (NP) or a verb phrase (VP), or as an adjunct to an NP or a 
VP (Figure 5 in the previous section shows a PP attaching as an adjunct to the VP). There 
are various ways to determine how PPs attach. Merlo and Ferrer (2006, p. 345-347) 
provide a set of diagnostics: 
I. Head dependence – the PP is an argument if the head depends on it 
semantically 
II. Optionality – the PP is an adjunct if it does not affect grammaticality 
III. Iterativity – arguments cannot be iterated, as the head selects only one 
argument 
IV. Ordering – only the first in a series of PPs can be an argument, the rest are 
adjuncts 
V. Copular paraphrase – adjuncts can be paraphrased by a copular relative 
clause 
VI. Deverbal noun – PPs preceded by a deverbal noun typically function as 
arguments 
 
Merlo and Ferrer (2006) remind the reader that the copular paraphrase and deverbal noun 
diagnostics only apply to PPs following an NP. Further, one can determine the position 
and function of a PP with one or more diagnostics, but not all of them need to apply like a 
checklist. Although Merlo and Ferrer developed these with a computational application in 
mind (i.e. corpus studies), the principles serve well to distinguish among PPs. The six 
diagnostics will therefore help inform the conclusions drawn in Chapter 4. 
 
Conclusion 
 Chapter 3 has introduced syntax, the concept of tree structure, and the syntactic 
category of prepositions. These are the final sections of background that will be given to 
set the stage for my ultimate analyses. 
To the present point, this thesis has provided a depiction of legal language, and it 
has attempted to illuminate the natural connection between linguistics and the law. It has 
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identified a gap in the literature and begun to argue for the utility of syntax in statutory 
interpretation. In Chapter 4, I will attempt to bring all of these pieces together. 
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CHAPTER 4 
ANALYSIS OF CASES 
In legal matters, conceptual vagueness tends to dominate as the source of debate 
and confusion, but that does not exclude entirely instances of linguistic ambiguity (Solan, 
2010). Sometimes ambiguity appears forced in the courtroom, as the prosecution and the 
defense strive to develop distinct arguments over the same, ostensibly clear statutory 
language. One of the two cases analyzed in this paper fall into this category. Even though 
it can be argued that only one reading is possible for the given statutory language, an 
either/or must be resolved. The second case provides an example of genuine ambiguity. 
Chapter 4 will proceed as follows: the first section is an analysis of Flores-
Figueroa v. United States (2009), a case that centers on the scope of “knowingly.” In 
searching for cases, I consulted the Corpus of US Supreme Court Opinions (2017) 
(CUSSCO), created at Brigham Young University. I selected Flores-Figueroa because, 
to my knowledge, it is the most recent one involving the word “knowingly” – a topic 
treated by Solan (1993) and Cunningham et al. (1994) – and that features an issue of 
syntax. Since 2009, The Supreme Court has heard several cases with regard to 
“knowingly” (Rosemond v. United States, 2014; McFadden v. United States, 2015; Shaw 
v. United States, 2016), but these hinge more on conceptual matters than linguistic ones. 
The same is true of cases on the docket and yet to be heard by the Supreme Court 
between the presented date of this paper – spring 2017 – and the closing of the 2016 court 
session – summer of 2017. 
The second section is an analysis of In re Sanders (2008), which involves a canon 
of interpretation and hinges on the syntactic relationship of a verb and an adverbial. The 
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United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit, heard this case. I also consulted the 
CUSSCO to find a similar, more recent case that had perhaps reached the Supreme Court. 
Numerous cases involved, for instance, the canons of prior-construction, constitutional 
avoidance, and waivers of sovereign immunity (Lightfoot v. Cendant Mortgage Group, 
2017; McFadden v United States, 2015; Federal Aviation Administration et al. v. Cooper, 
2012), but as Scalia and Garner (2012) note, these are more pertinent to procedure than to 
interpretation, although they certainly aid in the latter. Nonetheless, In re Sanders is a 
case where the debate over statutory language started in bankruptcy court and, through 
appeals, went through the district court and reached the Sixth Circuit. 
A concluding section provides an overview of the two analyses in this chapter, 
along with some preliminary conclusions with regard to the overall objective of this 
thesis, which is to demonstrate the utility of syntactic cartography as a forensic linguistics 
tool. 
 
Identity Theft, mens rea, and a PP in Question 
In Chapter 3, I overviewed the work of Solan (1993) and Cunningham et al. 
(1994), both of which feature analyses of cases involving the word “knowingly” (i.e. 
United States v. Yermian, 1983; United States v. Staples, 1994). While it may seem 
difficult to conceive of someone breaking the law unknowingly, or at least 
unintentionally, this type of case frequently reaches the Supreme Court. One will be 
analyzed in this section. 
In cases with the word “knowingly,” the statutory languages imposes what is 
called a scienter requirement (scienter is the Latin correlate of knowingly). The 
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requirement asks the judge to look for mens rea, or ‘a criminal state of mind,’ and it is in 
place to help determine innocence or guilt based on the provable knowledge or intent of 
the accused. In the absence of such a principle, “the state would be in a position to punish 
people for the consequences of actions in which they did not even intend to engage” 
(Solan, 1993, p. 68). The concept of mens rea is divisible into four sections, such that a 
criminal or guilty mind can be purposeful, knowing, reckless, or negligent (Ginther et al., 
2014). These subtle but important nuances, along with their ramifications, naturally vary 
from case to case, but for the present study, simply distinguishing between knowing and 
not knowing will suffice. 
Recall Solan’s (1993) argument that the position of a PP affects the perceived 
ambiguity of the statute, namely to what extent the scope of “knowingly” reaches. The 
following analysis will similarly attempt to illustrate one instance of how “knowingly” 
interacts syntactically with PPs. 
 
Flores-Figueroa v. United States (2009). In 2006, Ignacio Carlos Flores-
Figueroa, a citizen of Mexico, gave his U.S. employer various forms of counterfeit 
identification, including a false Social Security card. The name he provided was his own, 
but the identifying numbers were those of a U.S. citizen. Arrested and charged for this 
action, he was later found guilty under 8 U.S.C. § 1325(a), 18 U.S.C. § 1546(a), and 18 
U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1) by the District Court, which the Eighth Circuit affirmed. Flores-
Figueroa admitted to the former charges (entering the United States without inspection 
and misusing immigration documents) but challenged the latter (aggravated identity 
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theft), claiming it impossible for the Court to determine he knew the ID information in 
question belonged to someone else. 
The focus in Flores-Figueroa v. United States is whether or not the Court must 
prove that he knowingly provided the identification of another person. Justice Breyer, 
writing for the majority, makes a useful distinction between a real ID and fake one: the 
information on (or taken from) a real ID corresponds with that of another person, and the 
information on a fake one does not. If the Court can prove Flores-Figueroa knew his ID 
bore real information, 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1) prescribes a two-year extension to his 
prison sentence. A Supreme Court reversal would alternately shorten his prison sentence 
by the same amount of time. Figure 8 provides the language found in 18 U.S.C. § 
1028A(a)(1): 
Figure 8 – 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1) (emphasis added) 
(1) In general.— 
Whoever, during and in relation to any felony violation enumerated in subsection 
 (c), knowingly transfers, possesses, or uses, without lawful authority, a means of 
 identification of another person shall, in addition to the punishment provided for 
 such felony, be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 2 years. 
 
Before reaching the Supreme Court, the judges in the District Court and the Eight Circuit 
concluded that “knowingly” modifies the subsequent language up until a means of 
identification, excluding the final three words of another person. Flores-Figueroa 
contended that it modifies both phrases, that is, the entire phrase, and that because the 
Court could not determine that he knew the ID numbers belonged to another person, he 
should be acquitted on that count. The Supreme Court agreed with Flores-Figueroa. 
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 Supporting its decision, the Court notes that the very name of the crime, 
aggravated identity theft, implies that knowingly modifies of another person (Flores-
Figueroa, 2009). In other words, a theft requires something to be taken from someone 
else, not simply that someone has created the desired item or result out of thin air. 
The Court also consulted the legislative history, but it based its conclusion 
primarily on the language of the statute. Citing ordinary English and a natural reading of 
the text, the Court argues, “where a transitive verb has an object, listeners in most 
contexts assume that an adverb (such as knowingly) that modifies the transitive verb tells 
the listener how the subject performed the entire action, including the object as set forth 
in the sentence” (Flores-Figueroa, 2009, p. 4). To investigate this point, the relevant 
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Figure 9 – Tree structure of 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1) 
 
It is assumed here that the relevant language of 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1) reads: 
“Whoever...knowingly transfers...without lawful authority, a means of identification of 
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another person...” With the sole inclusion of “transfers,” it is implied that the clause 
interchangeably repeats with the verbs “possesses” or “uses.” To arrive at the conclusions 
illustrated above, I applied the Merlo and Ferrer (2006) attachment diagnostics discussed 
in Chapter 3. 
 The PP of identification attaches to the N means as an argument because of head 
dependence. Listeners or readers know what kind of means is intended because of the 
clarifying PP that follows. Because each component relies on the other, they do not 
exhibit optionality. With head dependence and optionality under review, another 
diagnostic is the copular paraphrase, which instructs that only an adjunct can undergo 
paraphrasing with a copular relative clause. In this case, it would require a means that 
was of identification to pass a grammaticality test. It does not. The deverbal noun 
diagnostic does not apply here, and the ordering diagnostic (and the very closely related 
iterativity diagnostic) only supports the others already considered to this point, that is, it 
argues that in a series of PPs only the first can be an argument. Because this does not 
prevent it from being an argument and because of the results from the other diagnostics, 
the PP of identification attaches to the tree as an argument of means. 
 In like fashion, the PP of another person is displayed in Figure 9 as an argument 
to identification. This is done through the same line of consideration as in the previous 
paragraph. Yet another piece of supporting evidence for this conclusion is the fact that 
statistically, the preposition of attaches as an argument 99.8 times out of 100 (Merlo & 
Ferrer, 2006). 
It is held that the PP of another person is an argument, but what does this mean 
for Flores-Figueroa? The tree affirms the ruling of the Supreme Court, namely that of 
  56 
another person falls in the scope of knowingly. This comes by way of constituent 
command, or c-command. On the tree structure, the adverb phrase (AP) knowingly forms 
a constituent with its sister V’, and that relationship signifies that it modifies everything 
from there down. Conversely, everything positioned higher in the tree (whoever and 
without lawful authority) is not within the scope of knowingly. Therefore, the tree not 
only affirms the ruling of the Supreme Court, but it also refutes the counterargument of 
the District Court and the Eighth Circuit. 
If, for the sake of hypotheticals, the of in of another person fell into the rare .2% 
that does not attach as an argument, it would not necessarily fall under the scope of 
knowingly because it could, in theory, appear elsewhere (higher) in the tree. This is 
plausible given the free-attaching nature of adjuncts. Problems quickly arise, though, as 
the phrase would have to attach either in succession with without lawful authority or 
perhaps somehow to whoever (it could also potentially fall in line with the phrase during 
and in relation to any felony violation enumerated in subsection (c), although I did not 
include that portion in Figure 9). If this were the case, knowingly would have no force on 
of another person, per the District Court and Eighth Circuit, and the PP, relocated in the 
published statute, would render the clause entirely incoherent. Figure 10 and Figure 11 
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Figure 10 – First positional alternation for of another person 
 
Figure 11 – Second positional alternation for of another person 
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Reading the language directly off of the tree would result in an 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1) 
that either says “Whoever...knowingly transfers...without lawful authority, of another 
person, a means of identification...” (in Figure 10) or “Whoever...knowingly transfers...of 
another person, without lawful authority, a means of identification...” (in Figure 11). 
These options, again, appear entirely incoherent. 
 In the three trees in this section, the word knowingly is positioned just above 
transfers. The epistemic nature of the verb calls for a higher placement in the tree, likely 
just above the highest PP adjunct. This would not change the matter of c-command for 
knowingly, as the rest of the clause would still fall in its scope. The reason for placing it 
lower in the clause is to better capture the sequence of the phrasing in 18 U.S.C. § 
1028A(a)(1). Interestingly, placing knowingly higher in the tree, above both of the PP 
adjuncts, would still mean that it modifies of another person, but, as has been shown, the 
language would not make any sense. All said, what the trees in this section have show is 
that it is an unconvincing position to assert that the scope of knowingly reaches only as 
far as identification. 
 
Bankruptcy Filing, a Syntactic Canon, and a Contested Adverbial 
Chapter 1 featured a discussion on textualism, along with a few examples of the 
canons of interpretation. Scalia and Garner (2012) list dozens more of these, including a 
syntactic guideline known as the nearest-reasonable-referent canon, which reads: “When 
the syntax involves something other than a parallel series of nouns or verbs, a prepositive 
or postpositive modifier normally applies only to the nearest reasonable referent” (p. 
152). This is in contrast with the series-qualifier canon (given in the section before the 
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nearest-reasonable-referent canon in Scalia and Garner), which provides that when there 
is a parallel series of nouns or verbs, the modifier, pre- or postpositive, applies to the 
collective series (Scalia & Garner, 2012). It should be noted once more that these canons 
serve not as strict rules but as formal suggestions on how to proceed with statutory 
language. 
Scalia and Garner (2012) provide In re Sanders (2008) as an example of a case 
involving the nearest-reasonable-referent canon. For the purposes of this section, I will 
present a summary of the case and its arguments as found in the Sixth Circuit court 
opinion. I will subsequently provide a tree-based analysis in the fashion of the previous 
section. 
 
In re Sanders (2008). Jason Sanders filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy on July 29, 
2002, and he received a discharge, or relief, of his debts the following February (Chapter 
7 of the Bankruptcy Code features instructions for liquidating assets with the purpose of 
repaying owed sums). Fewer than four years after the February discharge, Sanders filed 
for Chapter 13 bankruptcy (Chapter 13 differs from 7 in that it entails establishing a new 
payment plan for indebted individuals who have a reliable source of income), but the 
court denied his request for a second discharge because of its reading of the language in 
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Figure 12 – 11 U.S.C § 1328(f) (emphasis added) 
(f) Notwithstanding subsections (a) and (b), the court shall not grant a discharge of all 
debts provided for in the plan or disallowed under section 502, if the debtor has received 
a discharge— 
(1) in a case filed under chapter 7, 11, or 12 of this title during the 4-year period 
 preceding the date of the order for relief under this chapter, or 
(2) in a case filed under chapter 13 of this title during the 2-year period preceding 
 the date of such order. 
 
The bankruptcy court argued that according to the statute, Sanders was ineligible for a 
discharge because four years had not passed since his previous discharge. In other words, 
the court determined that the word “during” modifies the phrase “received a discharge.” 
The district court, however, asserted that “during” modifies the verb “filed.” Under that 
reading, Sanders qualifies for a discharge under his second petition, given that four years 
had transpired since he last filed. The Chapter 13 trustee appealed the case, which was 
then heard by the United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit in December of 2008 
(interestingly, Sanders’ file date for Chapter 13 came only a month before the four-year 
mark of his Chapter 7 discharge – and the Sixth Circuit reached its decision almost two 
years after that). 
 Judge Sutton, writing for the Sixth Circuit, cites the last antecedent guideline, and 
he concludes that the language is plain and requires no adjustment in punctuation. He 
also notes that if the “during the 4-year period” phrase truly modified “received a 
discharge,” congress would have positioned it earlier in the statute. Another important 
observation is the fact that reading the statute by the bankruptcy court’s interpretation 
would render the verb “filed” superfluous (In re Sanders, 2008). The discharge-to-filing 
reading further generates illogical outcomes, such as the fact that, in theory, it encourages 
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a chapter 20 bankruptcy, which the Bankruptcy Code is in place to prevent (In re 
Sanders, 2008). 
 As a preliminary consideration in the analysis, it bears noting that two lexical 
verbs are present in the relevant language, namely received and filed, which indicates the 
presence of a subordinate clause (van Gelderen, 2013). With respect to 11 U.S.C § 
1328(f), this means that has received and filed are in separate clauses, such that the 
division of the bolded and underlined language in Figure 12 leaves the debtor has 
received a discharge in a case on one side and filed under chapter 7, 11, or 12 of this title 
and during the 4-year period on the other. Already, this begins to weaken the argument 
of the Chapter 13 trustee and the decision of the bankruptcy court. If the canon holds, it 
seems very unlikely that the phrase during the 4-year period would find its nearest 
reasonable referent in a separate clause. But there is more to be considered. 
The contention in In re Sanders is over the preposition during, but the language in 
11 U.S.C § 1328(f) is replete with PPs. Sorting out the position and role of each, at least 
those in the bolded and underlined portions, will further aid in reaching a conclusion on 
the during phrase. On this point, I return to the Merlo and Ferrer (2006) diagnostics. 
First, the PP in a case seems to only have one option given the subordination of 
the subsequent clause. In other words, it is likely that in a case attaches to the debtor 
received a discharge. Even so, how it attaches is worth knowing. On the presumption that 
in a case is the only PP in the clause, the iterativity and ordering diagnostics have no 
claim. The PP is not grammatically dependent on the head discharge, which demonstrates 
its optionality. From one angle, in a case does follow a deverbal noun, suggesting that it 
may function as an argument. However, under the copular paraphrase diagnostic, it is an 
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adjunct because of the grammaticality of a discharge that was in a case. Arguments, 
according to Merlo and Ferrer (2006), “cannot be paraphrased by a copular relative 
clause” (p. 347). I conclude that in a case is an adjunct, and therefore the PP attaches as 
the sister to V’, as shown in Figure 13: 
Figure 13 – “the debtor has received a discharge in a case” 
 
The tree above shows how the PP in a case modifies the V received. It is important to 
note that this PP and the others that follow will modify the V and not the NP. This is an 
area in the In re Sanders discussion that is misleading from both sides of the argument. 
Each part attempts to determine whether during modifies discharge or filed, when, again, 
as the tree structure above shows, the PP adjunct really modifies the V and not the NP. 
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Conceptually, it works to talk about discharges and filings, but because of the way the 
statute is written, the verbs at play, in terms of what adjuncts modify, are not the ones 
really addressed by either party. I will return to this point in the conclusion. First, I will 
look at the PPs of the subordinate clause. 
After filed, there are three PPs: under chapter 7, 11, or 12; of this title; and during 
the 4-year period – there are, of course, more, but for the purpose of this study, I am 
limiting the analysis to the most pertinent factors. To begin, the of this title phrase 
attaches to the DP chapter 7, 11, or 12, and I make this claim based on the statistic 
presented with the previous case, namely that 99.8% of PPs beginning with of attach as 
arguments. This works because of this title is not first in the series (and therefore not an 
argument to filed), and it says nothing about how or when the case was filed, whereas the 
PPs beginning with under and during do. Under this assumption, the field is narrowed to 
two PPs: under chapter 7, 11, or 12 of this title and during the 4-year period. The next 
step is to determine the attachment of under and during. 
The ordering diagnostic from Merlo and Ferrer dictates that in a series of PPs, 
only the first one can function as an argument, leaving the others without any option as to 
their adjunct-hood. Thus, only the under phrase has the option of attaching to filed as an 
argument, but this does not necessarily require it to be one. The during phrase, 
alternately, must be an adjunct. 
With respect to the attachment of the under phrase, the copular paraphrase and 
deverbal noun diagnostics do not apply. Measuring against the optionality diagnostics, 
the under phrase does not feel directly obligatory to the grammatically of the clause, 
though for the phrase to end with the word filed feels lacking in some way. The nature of 
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this verb seems to want either an argument or an adjunct to say what was filed or how 
something was filed. Based on the context of the statute, though, this information is 
crucial to its meaning. Still, it seems most accurate in this instance to classify the under 
as an adjunct, as well as the during PP. This conclusion will make more sense shortly, but 
for now, Figure 14 provides an initial visual of these placements: 
Figure 14 – “filed under Chapter 7, 11, or 12 of this title during the 4-year period” 
 
Note that because my aim is an economic analysis, I have grouped chapter 7, 11, or 12 of 
this title in a DP “hanger” – hangers are cartographic shorthand that help abbreviate less-
vital portions of an analysis. The during PP is the sister of V’, which, to a degree, places 
it a little closer to received in the hierarchy of the main clause. Notwithstanding, 
assuming that it attaches in the subordinate clause, the nearest reasonable referent is filed. 
This conclusion agrees with the Sixth Circuit. 
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Yet, when taking into account the relevant language of 11 U.S.C § 1328(f) as a 
whole, a pair of options emerge with respect to possible tree structures. Consider the 
following diagrams: 
Figure 15 – First representation of 11 U.S.C § 1328(f) 
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Figure 16 – Second representation of 11 U.S.C § 1328(f) 
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Figure 17 – Third representation of 11 U.S.C § 1328(f) 
 
The structures in Figure 15, Figure 16, and Figure 17 illustrate three possible 
interpretations of the statute. Because of the nature of the verb filed, as previously 
discussed, it seems more likely that the under PP attach with the filed VP, even though it 
is still an adjunct. I therefore argue that Figures 15 and 16 are the only likely options.  In 
the first one, the during phrase modifies filed, but in the second one, the PP modifies 
received. Both outcomes are possible. From a syntactic perspective, the statute is 
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ambiguous and the Sixth Circuit and the bankruptcy court each have valid arguments. So 
what can be concluded from the analysis? 
The analysis leads to three main conclusions. First, it shows that the language of 
11 U.S.C § 1328(f) is not plain or clear. The Sixth Circuit contrastively believed that it 
was. Judge Sutton pointed out that the interpretation in Figure 16 (that of the bankruptcy 
court) leads to an illogical, purpose-defeating outcome. It seems that claiming plainness 
because of the implications of alternative readings is not an accurate or helpful way to 
classify plain language. Plain, unambiguous language classifies as such when it “limit[s] 
to one the possible interpretations of a sentence” (Solan, 1993, p. 64). 
Second, although identifying the ambiguity of the statute does not yield a 
conclusive interpretation, it is not entirely without value because this syntactic approach 
supports the importance of the canons of interpretation. Given the indeterminacy of the 
language itself, the direction to look for the nearest reasonable referent in In re Sanders 
helps resolve the ambiguity. Without the canon, it appears that neither side of the 
argument would really have a claim on what the appropriate outcome should be. Thus, 
just as Cunningham et al. (1995) found, a close analysis of the statutory language can 
help point a judge in the right direction with regard to consulting legislative history or to 
considering how the available interpretations contrast from a conceptual standpoint. 
Third, as mentioned, this analysis provided an important clarification on the 
argument between the various courts and the parties involved. Everyone talked about 
whether during modified discharge or filed. As the trees depict, during gives temporal 
information only to the V. In other words, during must refer to when the client received a 
discharge or to when he filed for bankruptcy. Again, from a conceptual standpoint, this 
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distinction does not change very much in terms of the outcome of the case, but it does 




 Chapter 4 has provided an analysis of Flores-Figueroa v. United States (2009) 
and In re Sanders (2008). The first analysis offers a conclusive argument on the language 
in question, and it agrees with the overall ruling of the Supreme Court. It shows what the 
alternative readings and interpretations would require from a syntactic perspective, and it 
argues for why these are unconvincing. The second analysis does not offer a conclusive 
argument, but it does point out the value of recognizing ambiguity where it exists. 
Ambiguity, I have argued, can serve well as a point of departure when considering other 
resources and forms of analysis, namely legislative history or conceptual logic. 
 The aim for economy in each analysis resulted in tree structures that are rather 
simplistic. One might notice empty spaces in the diagrams, for example. There is 
evidence in the syntax literature for the movement of parts and pieces throughout the tree. 
Work by Sportiche (1988) and Koopman and Sportiche (1991), for instance, gives 
evidence that the subject (an NP or DP) of a sentence begins in the specifier of the VP 
and later moves up to the specifier of the TP (collectively known as the VP-Internal 
Subject Hypothesis, or VPISH). 
 Another important point on the illustrations in this thesis is the tree structures in 
Figure 15 and 16. Because of the presence of a reduced relative clause, I drafted a section 
of the trees based loosely on the work of Kayne (1994) on relative clauses. This helps 
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take into account that the statute, in essence, reads in a case which was filed under, only 
the “which was” has been reduced. Otherwise the word case would be under the DP as a 
case instead of where I placed it in the specifier of CP. A rendering more faithful to 
Kayne (1994) would illustrate the movement taking place, similar to that occurring with 
the VPISH considerations. 
 Notwithstanding these technicalities, the tree structures represent the information 
relevant to the cases at hand. They help illustrate arguments and conclusions in ways that 
the linear presentation of the language alone cannot. In point, they show the ability that 
syntactic cartography, in the non-technical sense of the term, has to conceptualize legal 
language in new dimensions in a way that neither attempts to circumvent or supplant the 
interpretive methods instantiated by the legal profession. 
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSION 
This thesis has presented a retrospective analysis of PPs in two appellate court 
cases. It has also argued for the utility of syntax trees in representing and analyzing 
statutory language. With respect to Flores-Figueroa v. United States (2009), the analysis 
agreed with the Supreme Court’s ruling, and with respect to In re Sanders (2008), the 
analysis also agreed with the Sixth Circuit’s ruling, at least in part. The contrast in the 
latter being that this thesis has discovered ambiguity in the statute, whereas the court 
declared the language plain. Between the two analyses, this paper has shown how tree 
structures can help reach a conclusion and how they can help identify the need for 
interpretive resources beyond the language in the statute. 
The ideal application of the concepts and arguments in this thesis would be to 
submit them in advance of the cases being heard. Given the dates of each, 2008 and 2009, 
this was not possible here. It is admittedly less compelling and less contributive to 
advance these comments retrospectively, but at the same time, it has shown how one 
might employ such an approach with active cases. Given the nature of this paper (i.e. a 
thesis) collaboration in the style of Cunningham et al. (1994) was also impossible. 
Notwithstanding, I have argued that the best way to submit this kind of analysis, again in 
future cases, is through a scholarly article in a law review or another journal publication 
(rather than as an amicus brief). In the future, I hope to collaborate with others from both 
disciplines – linguistics and the law – to do just that. 
Beyond the direct application of these analyses to the interpretation of statutes, 
their value extends into a couple of related areas, which may serve well as future 
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directions. The first area, I contend, is at the very point of drafting. Pinker (2014) 
suggests that tree structures can aid in the writing process because they give the writer a 
better understanding of the task he or she is imposing on the reader by choosing one 
phrasing over another. If the drafters of 11 U.S.C § 1328(f) knew, for instance, the 
inherent ambiguity of the statute, perhaps they could have adjusted the language from the 
outset to preempt cases like In re Sanders. While it may seem like a cumbersome task to 
draw tree after tree at the legislative desk, it may help resolve unnecessary debates and 
outcomes in the future. Such an application may also seem rather quixotic, but the very 
fact that laws create and extinguish rights and obligations seems to merit the investment 
(Ainsworth, 2008). 
The second area where these analyses may apply is to jury instructions. As 
Chapter 1 discussed, the way that an author drafts instructions to the jury depends on an 
initial interpretation of the original governing text. Perhaps these illustrations might also 
be used in court. They could be used to determine what the instructions say or, in line 
with Dattu’s (1998) proposal, they may even be presented as part of the instructions. 
Looking to the tree structures could help determine “what a linguistically competent 
person would understand a statute to say,” particularly one without any legal training (i.e. 
a juror) (Fallon, 2014, p. 707). With regard to this application, collaboration with 
psycholinguistic experts could hold a lot of promise. 
As to the quality of the analysis, it would be reasonable for future studies to 
include more detail in the tree structures. Chapter 4 pointed out a few of the areas that 
were essentially overlooked in the analysis but that could potentially reveal more layers 
to the issues at hand. The reasoning henceforth has been to provide an economic analysis, 
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but, as Chapter 2 discussed, there must also be a balance in providing a thorough 
evaluation that brings the parties involved closer to the whole truth. Even so, similar 
work at a later date should explore more of the possibilities that deeper syntactic analysis 
could facilitate, as this thesis has only begun to address the gap that exists in the 
literature. 
Further, there is the prospect for a broad range of studies that focus on other parts 
of speech than prepositions. Future cases will invariably present opportunities to look at 
statutory language from my syntactic angles, and I believe tree structures can 
demonstrate similar efficiency in diagramming those issues. Collaboration with 
semanticists would also likely prove fruitful in the search for meaning in statutory 
language. In addition, linguists with interests outside of syntax should consider 
developing and applying analogous visual tools in the courtroom, whether for the task of 
statutory interpretation or some other form of participation in the legal system.  
In any of these approaches, linguists must take into consideration the various 
dynamics of being an expert witness or a contributing scholar. Chapter 2, for example, 
discussed the issues of deciding how much detail to provide in an analysis and what may 
constitute a breach of ethics. Chapter 4 addressed the former matter by showing that there 
were a few things left out of the tree structures in order to arrive at the most accessible 
product. There is also the matter of staying within one’s bounds and not assuming that on 
matters of language a judge should show total deference to the expertise of a linguist. As 
Cunningham et al. (1994) were careful to point out, they did not claim to have found the 
right answer on the cases they analyzed. Even by doing so, they received a fair amount of 
harsh criticism at the 1995 Northwestern/Washington University Law and Linguistics 
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Symposium. Building a relationship of mutual respect between the disciplines involved in 
forensic linguistics is critical. 
Chapter 1 provided another overview that linguists should account for in their 
work, and that is the nature of legal language and how it distinctly contrasts with civic or 
non-legal language. Because of the nature of legalese, much of which is arguably 
contrived to meet its ends, many of the linguistic principles and conventions that hold 
elsewhere will not relate to the language of the law. Nevertheless, the field of linguistics, 
and particularly that of forensic linguistics, has the choice opportunity to help build 
bridges that benefit everyone involved with and living under the law. 
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